Abstract. The applicability of model-checking is often restricted by the size of the considered system. To o vercome this limitation, a number of techniques have been investigated. Prominent among these are data independence, abstraction, and compositionality. This paper presents a methodology based on deductive reasoning and model-checking which combines these techniques. As we s h o w, the combination of abstraction and compositionality g i v es a signi cant added value to each o f t h e m i n isolation. We substantiate the approach proving safety of a sliding window protocol of window size 16 using Spin and PVS.
Introduction
Model-checking CE81,QS81] has proven a valuable approach for the formal, automatic veri cation of reactive systems. The size of the system to be veri ed limits, however, the applicability of this approach. First of all, many applications such as protocols use in nite data domains. This immediately renders the state space in nite, and hence, simple state exploration fails. Even when dealing with nite data, systems of parallel processes yield a state space exponential in the number of processes. This is known as the state explosion problem.
The obstacle of in nite data domains can be tackled by the data independence technique Wol86]. Intuitively, a program is data independent if its behavior does not depend on the speci c values of the data. In this case, many properties of the program stated over an in nite data domain can be equivalently expressed over nite domains that must contain enough elements. We call safety of data independence the requirement that the nite and in nite properties are equivalent.
Abstraction techniques are a prominent approach to address the state explosion problem (see e.g. CGL94,BBLS92,Lon93,DGG94,Dam96]). Abstraction is a general approach CC77] which allows to deduce properties of a concrete system by examining a more abstract |and in general smaller| one. Both systems are connected by an abstraction relation which is called safe with respect to a given property, if it preserves satisfaction of the property. This means, whenever the property holds for the abstract system, it holds for the concrete one as well. In general, for a given concrete system, the abstract one depends on the property to be established. Therefore, in case the property t o b e v eri ed is global, i.e., it depends on the exact behavior of all processes, it is hard to signi cantly abstract these components. It should be intuitively clear that the more local to a set of processes a property is, the more radically the remaining processes can be abstracted. Therefore, it is appealing to decompose a global property i n to a number of local ones which together imply the original one. Breaking a veri cation problem into more manageable subproblems is the essential idea of compositional reasoning (see e.g. dRLP98] for a recent collection of relevant w ork in this eld). To summarize, combining abstraction techniques and compositionality g i v es a signi cant added value to each of these techniques in isolation.
The veri cation requirements arising from the three techniques, namely safety of data independence and of the abstraction, as well as correctness of the decomposition, are in general undecidable. Escaping fully automatic reasoning, they are natural candidates for deductive reasoning. This means, the proposed methodology leads to a clean combination of model-checking and interactive theorem proving.
The contribution of this paper is to explore the proposed methodology and to substantiate its applicability with a safety proof of a sliding-window protocol. The chosen variant of the protocol is inspired by the one implemented in Mascara DPA + 98], a medium-access layer for wireless ATM-networks, which uses a window size of 16. Judging from experience, model-checking directly the protocol with this window size is far beyond the reach of Spin or similar model-checkers. Using decomposition together with abstraction and data independence we w ere able to automatically verify the decomposed subproblems with the Spin model-checker Hol91]. To verify the safety of the abstraction we used the theorem-prover PVS ORSvH95].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the techniques used towards veri cation. Section 3 contains (part of) the Promela model of the sliding window protocol before in Section 4 w e p r e s e n t safety proof for the protocol. Finally, Section 5 contains concluding remarks and references to related work. The complete Promela code and the PVS derivation can be found at http://www.informatik.uni-kiel.de/~kst/sw/.
Veri cation Approach
The goal is to prove that a system S, given as a parallel composition of a number of subsystems S i , satis es a given property ', t h a t i s S 1 k : : : kS n j = ':
In practice, when trying to apply model-checking in this setting, several problems occur. First, the data part is often in nite or at least very large. Second, the parallel composition of the S i 's leads to an exponential blowup of the state space of the overall system, which i s k n o wn as the state explosion problem. This paper presents a practical methodology to build abstract systems which can be handled by model-checkers. It is applied to a sliding window protocol taken from a wireless ATM protocol.
The methodology is based on three principles: 1. Decomposition of the property t o p r o ve, 2. data independence of the system, and 3. building abstractions.
Decomposition
We rst decompose the property ' into a set of properties ' 1 : : : ' k which together imply ', i . e . , ' 1^: : :' k =) ', s u c h t h a t e a c h property ' i is easier to establish than the original property '. In order to derive ' i , one can in turn use the principles of data independence, abstraction, and decomposition
As a guideline of a decomposition one should always try to introduce properties ' i for which only a few processes are relevant, and which are therefore local to these processes. In such a case, this property can be shown with very abstract versions of the remaining processes.
Data Independence
For a property ', w e m a k e use of the data independence Wol86] of a system to change the input language, favorably reducing the alphabet of the input language to a nite set. Data independence means that the system does not change the data received nor that it invents new data. For example, the system is allowed to compose the input to build new blocks in case it is later decomposed without change, or store some data and use it later unchanged. These assumptions can be checked syntactically and often hold for data-transmission protocols, and in particular, for the sliding window protocol of the following section.
When changing the input language, usually also the property ' has to be adapted yielding a property e ' over the new input language. The requirement e ' has to satisfy is that it holds for the program operating on the new input language if and only the original property holds for the program with the original input language.
For example, suppose we w ant t o c heck that a process, given as input the increasing sequence of natural numbers starting from 0, rst delive r s a 0 a s output. Since satisfaction of the property depends on whether 0 or any other value appears rst, one can identify all values other than 0. In other words, under the assumption that the process is data independent, one can show t h e stated property w i t h the restricted input language 0 1 1 , using only a nite alphabet instead of the natural numbers. Of course, in general the part of interest might not consist of a single process S j but of a set of processes. The connection between the concrete and the abstract system is given by an abstraction relation between the two s t a t e spaces. Since we consider only path universally quanti ed properties, it is su cient that the abstract versions e S l exhibit more behavior than the original S l with respect to the abstraction relation, i.e., the abstraction relation where C is the concrete state space and C is a concrete transition (respectively A and A for the abstract system).
In the veri cation of the sliding window protocol, we p r o ve safety o f a bstraction using the theorem prover PVS ORSvH95]. The translation of the system transitions and the state space into a PVS theory is straightforward and omitted from the paper.
Veri cation Strategies
The techniques presented above can be applied in any suitable order and the application can be iterated. Having in mind that a property should be decomposed into more local properties, it is, however, advantageous to rst apply decomposition. Indeed, it does not enlarge the state space but rather gives more possibilities for applying the two other abstraction techniques.
In the sequel, we present an iterative method which can be applied in order to decompose a given property i n to more local ones. To do so, assume we are given two processes S 1 and S 2 in parallel, and a property '. Suppose we want to show S 1 k S 2 j = ' and let C denote the chaotic process which exhibits all possible behaviors. In Figure 1 , we describe an (semi-)algorithm given in pseudo-code which can be applied to decompose a property into more local properties. In the given description we tacitly identify processes and properties and denote by R(S) the set of reachable states of S.
Clearly, w e can replace R(S 1 k 2 ) (resp. R( 1 k S 2 )) by a n y property which follows from R(S 1 k 2 ) (resp. R( 1 k S 2 )) and axioms which can be derived from the semantics such as the usual assumptions concerning the bu ers. We n o w illustrate this methodology by p r o ving safety of a sliding window protocol used in Mascara DPA + 98], a medium-access layer for wireless ATMnetworks. We start with a description of the protocol.
The Sliding Window Protocol
The sliding window protocol Ste76] is a communication protocol to guarantee reliable data transmission over unreliable, bu ered communication channels. Considering only unidirectional communication, the protocol consists of a sender and a receiver process, connected by t wo c hannels, one in each direction (cf. Figure 2) . The sender receives data from the source which has to be transmitted to the target. The data is sent to the receiver over the data channel, which may lose but not reorder messages. The sender stamps each data item with a sequence numbersuch that the receiver can detect whether a message had been lost. The receiver acknowledges received data by sending the sequence number which i t expects next over the lossy acknowledgment c hannel. The sender can retransmit unacknowledged messages, which are kept in the socalled transmission window until acknowledged. To hand out the data items to the target in the correct order, the receiver can temporarily store them in its reception window.
The protocol has three important parameters:
Transmission window size tw: This value speci es the maximal number of messages sent but not yet acknowledged together with those received from the source but not yet sent.
Reception window s i z e rw: This is the maximum number of messages that can be kept at the receiver side without being delivered.
Cardinality of sequence numbers n: Since the transmission window is nite, a nite set of sequence numbers su ces to ensure unique identi cation of each message. The protocol works correctly with at least n = tw + rw sequence numbers. In this case the numbersf0 : : : n ; 1g are used cyclically modulo n.
Mascara's sliding window protocol uses a transmission window size of 15 and size 1 for the receiver, which means the receiver either delivers a message in case it ts into the output stream or it discards it. The protocol uses the minimal possible amount of sequence numbers, namely 16. Although in general, a sliding window protocol assures safety o ver unbounded lossy FIFOchannels, in Mascara the bu er is restricted to a size of 16.
In the following we give the Promela model (Promela is the input language of Spin) for sender and receiver. 1 In Section 4 we will refer to the transitions of sender and receiver using the names mentioned in the comments of the Promela code. The lossiness of communication is modeled using Promela communication channels of bu er size 16, where the receiving side may d e c i d e nondeterministically to lose the message. As long as the transmission window is still capable of storing messages to be sent, the sender can read new data items from the data source. The new items are put in the open part of the window together with the already sent but yet unacknowledged messages. The position in the window corresponds with the sequence number given to the data items. Those messages are sent in the cyclic order of their sequence numbers (see Figure 3 ). This is done by the send transition. A speci c feature of Mascara's sliding window protocol is how the retransmission is triggered: in smooth operation of the protocol each acknowledgment will con rm one or more messages. The fact that twice the same acknowledgment i s received is taken as indication by the sender that a transmission error has occurred and it start resending (by setting next to send back t o last unacknowledged). Another cause for resending in practice is a timeout occurring in case the acknowledgments are too late. This situation is modeled here in a simpli ed way where the timeout is bound to occur when the maximum number of 15 unacknowledged cells has been sent ( sliding window full). An arriving acknowledgment causes the acknowledged message to fall out of the open window, the window 'slides' one message forward (receive ack). The acknowledgment m a y also be lost which is modeled by ack lost. If the receiver gets a message with the expected sequence number, it delivers the corresponding data item to the data target. The counter for the next expected sequence number is increased cyclically by 1. Also, an acknowledgment m a y b e s e n t a t a n y time, indicating the next expected sequence number (send ack).
Veri cation of the Sliding Window Protocol
We w ant to prove a safety property of the sliding window protocol of Section 3, namely that the protocol ensures reliable communication. This means no data item is lost nor duplicated and the receiver delivers the data in the original order. Relating the input stream at the sender to the output stream delivered by the receiver, we s a y that the protocol is correct, if for all input sequences the output sequence of each possible run of the protocol is a pre x of the input sequence. Trying to establish the correctness of the protocol with the full window size of 16 directly will not succeed using Spin.
Observing that the protocol is data independent, w e can start by considering the stream of natural numbers as input, as opposed to arbitrary data, i.e., it is enough to establish that if we h a ve as input the stream of natural numbers, the output is always a pre x thereof.
Before we formalize the properties, we i n troduce some useful notations. A sequence of data items from the data domain D is a function seq : N k ! D for a k 2 N f 1 g , t h i s k is the length of seq and is denoted as #seq. We also denote a sequence as (seq i ) i<k , o r ( seq i ) i2N in case #seq = 1. I f out is a possible output sequence of the sliding window protocol for a given input sequence in, w e denote this with out 2 SW (in). Let in N = ( j) j2N . A language is a set of sequences. For a language L, w e denote with out 2 SW (L) t h a t there is a word in 2 L with out 2 SW (in). A run or a computation with a certain input is a sequence of consecutive states of the sliding window protocol.
Lemma 1. If the protocol satis es the property For all out 2 SW (in N ) k < #out : out(k) = k (Prefix) then it is correct in the sense described a b ove. Proof. Assume that the protocol is erroneous, i.e., there exists an input sequence in and a trace of the protocol such that the output sequence out is no pre x of in. Then, we nd a rst error on a position k < #out such t h a t out(k) 6 = in(k) and for all j < k : out(j) = in(j):
Since the protocol is data independent, we can adapt this trace with the input In the following, let out be an arbitrary output sequence of the sliding window protocol for the input sequence in N .
Decomposition of (Prefix)
After exploiting data independence to simplify the data domain, we continue by a rst decomposition step, splitting the safety requirement i n to the following four properties. The induction principle motivates this decomposition. Property (Init) is the induction base, saying that the rst output is correct. The other properties decompose the induction step, which states that out(i) = i =) out(i + 1 ) = i + 1 .
One can observe that whatever happens between sender and receiver, the labeling of the input data items with the sequence numbers, and the receiving in just the right order of the sequence numbers done by the receiver, ensures Property ( Mod16), restricting the positions on which input data elements can occur in the output sequence.
Properties (WinSize) a n d ( Lose) n o w g i v e further restrictions to the output sequence positions, saying that the values of neighbored positions in the output sequence are not too far away.
Proof. We have to show that these properties together imply (Prefix), so We n o w establish Properties (Mod16), (Init), (WinSize), and (Lose).
In the following sections we use the abbreviations R for the receiver and S for the sender process. The notion send means that the message has been put into the channel. Considering a chaotic sender, we observe that R sends only acknowledgments n such that either n = 0, or n > 0 and R has received a message (d n ; 1) before. Since the messages are exchanged via a bu er, one can derive that R sends only n if either n = 0 , o r n > 0 a n d S has sent a message (d n ; 1) before.
If R behaves in this way, S can only send positions of the transmit window to which it has written before. Hence, we can derive a restriction for the messages standing in the bu er. With this restriction, we c a n construct an abstract system usable for veri cation of Property ( i ) .
This decomposition is explained in detail below.
Abstractions Even with the reduced input language the system is far from being model-checkable. The main problem for the veri cation are the bu ers from S to R and vice versa. A method often successful to overcome the state explosion caused by s u c h a bu er is to restrict the possible messages which can occur in it, and to use two variables as the abstract bu er: one which holds the head value of the bu er, and one boolean which is true if and only if the bu er is empty, since these are the important informations for one system step.
The abstraction relation then says that the abstract variable holds exactly the head value of the bu er in the case it is non-empty. This relation must be restored after each read operation by assigning arbitrary values to the abstract variables. Here, restricting these values is often helpful.
As explained, we n o w apply the decomposition principle from Section 2.4 and start considering a chaotic sender. This leads to the following property:
(ii) In every run (with input in m ), each a c knowledgment n sent b y R is either 0, or n > 0 a n d R received a message (d n ; 1) before.
Now we describe the abstraction used for the veri cation of this property.
We abstract the bu er from S to R in the way described above, discard the acknowledgment bu er, and use a c haotic sender which i s able to send any message. The receiver functionality i s u n c hanged, except that R is not required to send, and that R changes the bu er variables arbitrarily after reading a message. Then we use Spin to establish that property.
Since every message occurring in the bu er is written to it by S, Prop-
erty (ii) implies Property ( i i i ) .
(iii) In every run (with input in m ), each acknowledgment n sent by R is either 0, or n > 0 a n d S sent a message (d n ; 1) before.
Relying on this Property (iii), we obtain by setting S in parallel with a receiver ful lling Property (iii):
(iv) For all messages (d n) occurring in the bu er from S to R (at any time in any run with input in m ), d = n.
The abstract system used to establish Property (iv) by model-checking is the following. The bu er from S to R is discarded, and the acknowledgment bu er is abstracted in a similar way as before. The abstract receiver can non-deterministically send every acknowledgment a l l o wed by Property ( i i i ) .
S assigns non-deterministically values allowed by P r o p e r t y (iii) to the bu er variables after an acknowledgment reception, the rest of S is unchanged. For this abstract system, Property (iv) can be model-checked. Now w e describe the abstraction used for verifying Property (i) with Spin.
The channel from S to R is abstracted to two v ariables as described above, the acknowledgment bu er is discarded. After each read operation of R, R restores the abstraction relation by assigning non-deterministically a value (n n). These are the only possible values according to Property (iv). The abstract sender can assign arbitrary values (restricted by Property (iv)) to the bu er variables. Then, the property is easily model-checked using Spin. The abstraction relation ensures that the receiver variables of the abstract and concrete systems coincide, and that the abstract channel variable holds the head value of the concrete channel in case it is non-empty. The decomposition leads to a proof obligation, namely that the conjunction of Property (v) and (vi) implies Property ( Init). This is shown next. Proof. Consider a computation, a state in that computation, and assume #out > 0 in that state. With Property ( Mod16) w e know t h a t out(0) = 16k for a suitable k 2 N. By (v) we k n o w that before a data item d 16 is sent by S, the sender receives an acknowledgment a di erent from 0. Consider the point in the computation when S receives an acknowledgment a 6 = 0 for the rst time. Then, a was sent b y R, since the bu er does not invent data. Consequently, R has changed the value of its variable next expected which is initialized to 0, and therefore, R has received a message with sequence number0.
Every message which R receives was sent b y S earlier. Since (0 0) is the only message sent b y S so far with sequence number 0, R has received this message.
If R changes next expected, i t a l s o g i v es out the data item attached to the received message in the same atomic transition. Therefore, R starts the output sequence with the data item 0.
Data Independence By data independence we reduce the input language of the system for Property (v) to 0 15 0 1 0 ! . Adapting Property (v) to this new input language, we h a ve t o s h o w the following:
(vii) For all runs with the input language 0 15 0 1 0 ! , whenever S sends data value \1", S received an acknowledgment 6 = 0 before.
Now w e use abstraction to construct an abstract system used to model-check this property.
Abstraction For Property (vii), we c a n u s e a v ery abstract receiver which non-deterministically is able to send every possible acknowledgment. The functionality of the sender is unchanged, except two modi cations. First, the bu er between sender and receiver can be discarded. Second, the capacity o f the acknowledgment c hannel still leads to state space explosion. Therefore, we abstract the bu er analogously to Section 4.2 to two v ariables rec to send (for the head element) and rec to send empty. The abstract system can set these variables to arbitrary values after reading an acknowledgment. After constructing this abstract system, one can observe t h a t the functionality of the sender transition ack lost is almost the same than the functionality o f the whole receiver. Therefore, only little modi cations must be made to abstract away the whole receiver. The concrete receiver steps are then simulated by the abstract ack lost transition.
Furthermore, we i n troduce an auxiliary variable last sent which holds the value of the last data item sent and is used to formulate the property, and which replaces the abstract channel from S to R with respect to Property (vii).
The abstraction relation which de nes the relationship between the concrete and the abstract system is given in Figure 4 . Here, C (resp. A ) is a concrete (resp. abstract) state, head of a F I F O queue gives the next element which will be read, last gives the last value appended, proj i is the i'th projection, and nonempty o f a F I F O queue holds whenever the queue is not empty.
With this abstract system, it is possible to establish the (adapted) property using model-checking. We made the abstraction proofs using PVS. The translation of the Promela-model into a PVS theory is straightforward, and the abstraction proofs were almost automatic. It is obvious by initialization of the processes that n > 0. Case: Property (a) holds in state s n . C h o o s e i such that (a) holds for that i. Since n is the minimal position such that (a) holds, the last transition t n;1 must have added out(i + 1) to the output sequence. Since n is the minimal position for which one of (a){(d) holds, we k n o w t h a t i n s t a t e s n;1 (a) does not hold, which implies that Property ( Lose) holds together with the other Properties (Init){(WinSize).
Lemma 3 then implies, that the output sequence of s n;1 is 0 1 : : : i . Consequently, out(i) = i.
Step t n;1 extends this sequence with out(i + 1 ) . By (Mod16) we know that out(i + 1 ) = i + 1 + 1 6 k for a suitable k. With Property ( a ) w e then derive t h a t k 1. Consequently, out(i+1)> (i+1)+16.
Then, the sender has already sent i + 1 before. But this data item has never been given out by the receiver. On the other hand, the sender must have acknowledged data item i + 1 in the past, otherwise it could not get data item out(i + 1 ) i n to its transmit window. Hence, on an earlier point i n the computation, (b) must hold. Contradiction! Case: Property (b) holds in s n . Hence, by reading acknowledgments from the bu er, S can acknowledge a data item d which has not yet been given out by the receiver. Consider transition t n;1 . { t n;1 2 fsend timeout receive lost receiveg: In this case, the variables next free, last unacknowledged, a n d t h e b u e r rec to send are unchanged. Hence, (b) also holds in state s n;1 . C o n tradiction! { t n;1 = receive data: Consider rst the case that the new data item received by S and inserted in the transmit window on position j = s n;1 (next free) is the one falsely acknowledged. After step t n;1 , the sender is able to acknowledge d by reading acknowledgments. These transitions do not a ect variable next free. Hence, it is unchanged, and the only possibility to remove d from the transmit window, is to set the pointer last unacknowledged to position s n (next free).
Now consider that the same sequence of acknowledgment receptions is done beginning in state s n;1 . With this sequence of steps we reach a state s such that s(next free) = pred m (s(last unacknowledged)), which means the transmit window is maximally open.
In case the open window had this size already in s n;1 , i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e to take t n;1 in state s n;1 . C o n tradiction. In the other case, (c) is already satis ed in s n;1 . Now consider the case, that d was already in position j in the transmit window i n s t a t e s n;1 . In case s(last unacknowledged) = s n (next free), the transmit window in state s is again maximal. This again leads to a contradiction (either t n;1 is not enabled, or (c) is already valid in s n;1 ). { t n;1 2 freceive ack ack lostg: In this case, every state which can be reached by reading acknowledgments was also reachable before from s n;1 by reading acknowledgments. Hence, (b) must also hold in s n;1 .
This holds also for all subsequent cases, they are therefore left out. { t n;1 = send ack: In this case, (d) holds in state s n;1 , since the new acknowledgment appended to the acknowledgment c hannel by R is the value of its variable next expected.
Case: Property (c) holds in s n . By reading the acknowledgments in the acknowledgment bu er, S can acknowledge erroneously, which means it can enlarge its transmit window. Again, consider transition t n;1 . { t n;1 2 fsend timeout receive lost receiveg: (c) already holds in state s n;1 . C o n tradiction! { t n;1 = receive data: The sender is able to enlarge the open transmit window by reading some acknowledgments . Consider again the same reception sequence of acknowledgments but starting in s n;1 reaching a state s. If s(last unacknowledged) = s n;1 (next free), then in the sequence starting from s n enlarging the window, the resulting open window size is 1. But this is also the size in s n , t h us, the open window is not enlarged. Also if s(last unacknowledged) = s n (next free), the open window size is not enlarged.
Otherwise, in both sequences, starting either from s n or s n;1 , the open window size is enlarged by the same amount. Thus, (c) is already valid in s n;1 . { t n;1 = send ack: In this case, (d) holds in state s n;1 .
Case: Property (d) holds in s n . Assume that (a) does not hold. Then we c a n derive (using Lemma 3) that the output sequence is 0 1 : : : i for a suitable i 0. Consider transition t n;1 . { t n;1 2 f send timeout receive lostg: (d) also holds in state s n;1 . C o ntradiction! { t n;1 = send ack: Since the value of the variable next expected is appended to the acknowledgment c hannel, (d) is also valid in s n;1 . { t n;1 = receive data: Basically the same argumentation can be used as in the cases (b) and (c). One can think of an acknowledgment c hannel extended by the value of next expected. { t n;1 = receive: If the variable next expected is unchanged by t r a n s ition t n;1 , then (d) holds in s n;1 . Consequently, R must have received a message (d 0 n 0 ) with n 0 = s n;1 (next expected). Then, d 0 is given out by the receiver in this step, and there once was a state in which d 0 was in the transmit window on position n 0 .
Assume rst that (d) holds since the value of next expected can be a bad acknowledgment in the sense of (b).
Since (d) does not hold in s n;1 , the position in the transmit window i n which the error occurs must be position n 0 (since t n;1 increases |modulo window size| the variable next expected by 1). The output sequence (in state s n ) m ust be 0 1 2 : : : d 0 .
Hence, there is a data item d 00 > d 0 on position n 0 . Then, d 0 must have been acknowledged by the sender with a transition t j with j < n . S i n c e n is minimal, d 0 must already have been given out by R before step j. Consequently, d 0 is given out at least twice, once before transition t j and once by taking transition t n;1 . C o n tradiction! Since n 0 = pred m (n 00 ), n 0 would also enlarge it in case n 0 6 = s n (next free). But then, (d) would be valid in s n;1 . Consequently, s n;1 (next expected) = n 0 = s n (next free) = s n;1 (next free). But then, position n 0 in the transmit window o f s n;1 is not in the open transmit window. Thus, d 0 is already acknowledged. But it has not yet been given out in state s n;1 . Hence, (b) is valid in s n;1 .
Veri cation Results
The following In this paper we proposed a veri cation methodology that combines data independence, abstraction, and compositional reasoning. The essence of the approach is to exploit the added value of combining those techniques. Additionally it serves as a clean guideline to separate the properties amenable to automatic model-checking and those to be veri ed deductively.
We applied this methodology to analyze a realistic sliding window protocol taken from a wireless ATM protocol of window size of 16. To o u r k n o wledge, this is the largest size of a sliding window protocol veri ed with the help of model-checking techniques. In fact we applied the same methodology to prove a liveness property of the same protocol. Kai97] , who also uses a combination of model-checking, abstraction and decomposition. Di erent from our work, Kai97] does not use a theorem prover, but automatically checks safety of the abstraction using speci c behavioral preorders. He succeeds in proving safety and liveness up to the window size of 7.
